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Spinoza on Miracles and Superstition1
That religion is superstition, a ready tool by which the ruler controls the masses, and that 
reason must free people’s minds from it, sounds familiar to modern ears. The rationalists 
have been so keen to criticize superstitious belief as a human vice that religion has undergone 
pressure to cleanse itself of suspected superstition. Miracles, for instance, are they not a form 
of superstition too? If the answer is positive, it is in line with the criticism of religion that 
blazed during the Enlightenment. Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP) has been 
considered the most radical attempt among these rationalist criticisms of religion. In fact, 
soon after its publication in 1670 the treatise was condemned as a hideous book of atheism, 
and banned by the church and civil authorities. At first glance, its opening confirms this 
reputation, by starting with a high-toned criticism of superstition.
If men were able to exercise complete control over all their circumstances, or if con-
tinuous good fortune were always their lot, they would never be prey to superstition. 
But since they are often reduced to such straits as to be without any resource, and 
their immoderate greed for fortune’s fickle favors often makes them the wretched vic-
tims of alternating hopes and fears, the result is that, for the most part, their credulity 
knows no bounds....2
This fairly long Preface is followed immediately by Index Capitum, where there appears 
a series of critical chapters on revealed religion—prophecy, miracles, theology—and on 
the political issue of freedom and state power. This may give the impression that the book 
undertakes a harsh critical line that rejects religion as a set of superstitious beliefs adopted 
by the ruling powers for their own ends. In fact, many people have believed precisely this3. 
But is this Enlightenment reading sound? Does the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus aspire 
1 Based on Osamu Ueno, “Spinoza no kiseki meishin ron” [Miracles and Superstition in Spinoza’s 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus], Spinozana, No.2, 2000, pp.3-15, and revised for the present English 
version. The original paper was read at the conference of the Spinoza Society of Japan, held in Kyoto in 
Nov. 1999. The text followed is Benedictus de Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Künrath, 1670; 
in Spinoza Opera, Im Auftrag der Heiderberger Akademie der Wissenschaften hrg. von Carl Gebhardt, 
Carl Winter, 1925; 2. Auflage, 1972, Bd.3. For citation I consulted mostly the Complete Works /
Spinoza, translated by Samuel Shirley and others; and edited, with introduction and notes, by Mishael 
L. Morgan, Hackett, 2002.
2 TTP, p.5.
3 For exemple, Tosel (1984), p.26, Delahunty, p.174, Smith, pp.33-34, Strauss, p.247. See also Tosel’s 
reply to Henry Laux, who criticized him for blurring the distinction between superstition and religion. 
Tosel (1996), pp.173-174.
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to expose the alleged cozy relations between religion and power, as it is sometimes hailed 
as doing? Does it really attempt to shake people out of religious superstition? This is the 
question I shall address in what follows.
We should first be clear about the textual facts. Nowhere, in a text consisting of twenty 
chapters, do the words superstitio and miraculum appear alongside each other to form a 
single phrase. This means that there is no passage that explicitly correlates superstition and 
miracle. Of course this does not prove anything, for the author who was once denounced as, 
“Teaching sheer atheism with furtive and disguised arguments,”4 might be concealing his 
true intention. However, if we want to know what exactly he had in mind, we must carefully 
examine the details of his text where these words appear. 
1 Superstition and religion
There is a line in the Preface that has been quoted many times by way of attesting to his 
criticism of superstition. I quote the original Latin:
(1)  “ Nihil efficacius multitudinem regit, quam superstitio.” 5
Literally, “Nothing rules the masses more effectively than superstition.” It is interesting that 
some of our contemporary translations impose a slight modification in nuance. The French 
translation, by Madeleine Francès, for example, translates this same line into French as 
follows:
(1’)  “ La superstition est le plus sûr moyen auquel on puisse avoir recours pour gou-
verner la masse.” 6
This may be rendered as “Superstition is the surest means one can resort to to govern the 
multitude.” This translation is likely to give the impression that Spinoza is talking about 
superstition as a tool that rulers can use to control people. Another impressive line that 
appears a little later may support this impression, the famous line that denounces “the 
supreme mystery of despotism.” I quote:
4 Words uttered by Lambert Van Velthuysen, a Cartesian critic. Ep 42.
5 TTP, p.6
6 Francès, p.609.
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(2)  “The supreme mystery of despotism, its prop and stay, is to keep men in a state of 
deception, and with the specious title of religion it cloaks the fear by which they 
must be held in check, so that they will fight for their servitude as if for salvation, 
and count it no shame, but the highest honor, to spend their blood and their lives for 
the glorification of one man.”7
The resulting effect of the association of (1’) and (2) will not be trivial. It produces the 
conviction that the author despises religion, because it is a means of deceiving people for 
the benefit of a despotic power. Arguably, this is what Francès has in mind. In a note, she 
declares that from the entire text of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus one can extract the 
thesis that the doctrine of revelation is “superstition pure.” 8 It is difficult not to see this 
reflected in the decision she made to add the word “authority,” which does not appear in the 
original title, to render the title of the book as Traité des Autorités Théologique et Politique.9
However, this apparent association between religion, superstition, and authority is 
questionable. We should not overlook the slight change in syntax made in the translation: 
superstition appears as a means in (1’), while in (1) it is the agent, i.e., it is superstition that 
rules the masses. Another thing to keep in mind is that, as Spinoza himself declares, (1) is 
a quotation from the Historiae Alexandri Magni Macedonis of Quintus Curtius. There is no 
doubt that he was just as aware of the original context as his contemporary Dutch readers 
presumably were. As Curtius reports, there was an occasion when solders led by Alexander, 
weary of the long expedition against the Persians, were disturbed on seeing an ominous 
lunar eclipse, and a revolt against their king seemed possible. Alexander called Egyptian 
seers to the camp and let them make a prediction before his generals. Though they knew the 
astronomical truth, they pretended to assure them that an eclipse was a sign of the victory of 
the Greeks. This restored the spirit of the soldiers, and Alexander regained command. Then 
comes the passage “Nulla res multitudinem efficacius regit quam superstitio,” i.e., “Nothing 
rules the masses more effectively than superstition.”10 As is clear from the context, the story 
depicts superstition as something that the monarchical power finds intractable, and thus 
is not a means to an end. This is confirmed again by the passage immediately following: 
“alioqui impotens, saeva, mutabilis, ubi vana religione capta est, melius vatibus quam 
ducibus suis paret,” i.e., “Otherwise impotent, the wild and inconstant multitude is more 
obedient to the seers of their commanders than to the commanders themselves.”11 As Curtius 
reports elsewhere, that was why the King feared the seers, and sought their counsel in 
7 TTP, p.7.
8 Francès, p.1466: note 2.
9 Cf. note 1, p.1449. Francès takes the original title to mean De Imperio Theologico-Politico.
10 Curtius, IV. x, Vol. 1, pp.252-255.
11 Ibid.
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difficult times.12
There is no doubt that the discussion in the Preface traces the Curtian context. After 
considering historical examples, Spinoza points to the fact that, “It is in the state’s gravest 
difficulties (in maximis imperii angustiis) that seers have held the strongest sway over the 
people and have been most formidable to their own rulers.”13 Then he proceeds to point out 
the “inconstancy” inherent in superstitious belief. As superstition arises, he says, not from 
reason but from strong emotion, and is sustained only by hope, hatred, anger, and deceit, 
men’s readiness to fall victim to any kind of superstition makes it correspondingly difficult to 
persuade them to adhere to one and the same kind. As he concludes,
Indeed, as the multitude remains ever at the same level of wretchedness, so it is never 
long contented, and is best pleased only with what is new and has not yet proved de-
lusory. This inconstancy has been the cause of many terrible uprisings and wars, for—
as is clear from the above, and as Curtius, too, says so well in Book 4, ch.10—“Nihil 
efficacius multitudinem regit, quam superstitio.” So the multitude is readily induced, 
under the guise of religion, now to worship its rulers as gods, and then again to curse 
and condemn them as mankind’s common bane.14
The context reveals that relating superstition to a sure means of ruling is a misconception. In 
fact, instead of being “ le plus sûr moyen,” superstition under the guise of religion is regarded 
by Spinoza as a disturbing factor for rulers.15 
The immediate move Spinoza makes is worth noting. “To avoid therefore this disaster 
(hoc ergo malum ut vitaretur),” he continues, “immense efforts have been made to invest 
religion, true or false, with such pomp and ceremony that it can sustain any shock and 
constantly evoke the deepest reverence in all its worshippers” (ibid., the stress is my own). 
It is clear that, instead of condemning religion as superstition, the philosopher regards it 
as essential to counteract the potential threat of superstition. Religion, true or false, must 
in this respect be carefully institutionalized. It is not surprising, then, that he draws on the 
“false religion” of the Turks as a successful case. According to the philosopher, the Turks 
have achieved the greatest measure of success in this regard by holding even discussion of 
religion to be sinful, and by leaving no room in the mind for the exercise of reason, or even 
the capacity to doubt.16 No doubt, this example cannot be applied to a “free commonwealth” 
12 Curtius, IV. iv, Vol. 1, p.358-359.
13 TTP, p.6
14 Ibid.
15 Balibar seems not to be immune to the same failure as Francès. He translates the line in question 
as “Nul moyen de gouverner la multitude n’est plus efficase que la superstition,” and talks about 
“l’appareil monarchique et ecclésiastique de la superstition.” Balibar, p.298. This kind of 
misconception may date from the first reception of the TTP by early libertinism in France. Cf. Assoun, 
pp.176-178.
16 TTP, p.7.
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like the Dutch Republic, where freedom counts for much amongst the citizens. This is why 
the famous line (2) quoted above rejects the example of the Turks as “disastrous” to the 
Republic. This is not because it relies on superstition, but simply because, however efficient 
it may be, it is incompatible with the general freedom of the citizen. So, the point is not that 
the “false religion” of the Turks is to be condemned as superstition but, on the contrary, that 
the civil authority of the Republic must itself assume the same difficult task of counteracting 
superstition by means of “true religion”, which should be as efficient as the Turks’, and yet 
compatible with general freedom. It is just this issue that the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 
as a whole addresses. In this regard, it is pertinent to look at the declaration of the main 
theme of the book. Spinoza’s undertaking is, “To demonstrate that not only can this freedom 
be granted without endangering piety and the peace of the commonwealth, but also the peace 
of the commonwealth and piety depend on this freedom.”17 
That even a despotic regime needs institutional religion to avoid the disastrous effect of 
superstition is completely obscured by the unfortunate association Francès makes between 
religion, superstition, and authority. This failure is likely to mislead one to read the Preface 
as a declaration of war against a theologico-political authority that would exploit superstition 
under the cloak of religion, in order to control the masses. This is unfortunate, because its 
dashing criticism of religion loses sight of the true issue of the treatise, i.e., to contain the 
potential threat of superstition by means of “true religion”, which Spinoza defines in Chapter 
IV as “fides catholica”, compatible with a free commonwealth. So religion cannot be reduced 
to “superstition pure”.18 According to Banvenist, superstitio and religio were antonyms in 
the classics, and Curtius was known as one historian who was, amongst others, keen on 
the contrast. In fact, the Curtian lesson being “quite common knowledge,” the philosopher 
thought there was no need to say any more about it.19
2 Miracles
Let us move on to the other issue, miracla, which is treated mainly in Chapter VI of the 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, entitled “Of Miracles”. Spinoza denies that anything happens 
17 TTP, p.7.
18 In this respect we follow Donagan, who makes the point that we need not only a theory of 
superstition but also “a theory of revelation as non-scientific cognition,” which accounts for the “useful 
truth” that religion contains. See Donagan, p.32. See also the critical comment of Zac on the Straussian 
reading of Francès. Zac, pp.224-229.
19 TTP, p.6. Cf. the articles on “religio” and “superstitio” in Émile Benveniste, Le vocabulaire des 
institutions indo-européennes, vol.2, Paris, Minuit, 1969. See also Spinoza. Œuvres III - Traité 
Théologico-Politique, PUF, 1999, p.698, note 5.
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beyond the universal laws of nature, and definitely rejects any event contrary to Nature or a 
supernatural event.20 On the other hand, he proposes to understand miracles “as something 
(that) really happened.”21 He holds that some of the prodigious events related in the Scripture 
as miracles did, in the eyes of the ancient Hebrews, occur. What is the truth, then, with regard 
to the existence of miracles? Is this again the double-tongued talk of a suspicious author? 
The apparent ambiguity comes from ignoring the distinction Spinoza makes between 
those who relate an encountered event as a miracle, and those who draw on it to despise 
rational thinking, i.e., the distinction between the ancient Hebrews who witnessed miracles, 
and the contemporary vulgus with their company of theologians who harbor a resentment 
of natural reason. They both talk about miracles, but in different ways. Though Spinoza 
thinks the latter inherited the ignorance of the former, he does not pass over the change in the 
meaning of miracles.
For instance, the Book of Joshua relates a miracle in which the sun stood still, to enable 
Joshua to complete his battle against the Amorites. Such a phenomenon could really have 
occurred says Spinoza: “As a result of the excessive coldness of the atmosphere at that 
time, there may have been an unusually great refraction of light,” a presumption based on 
Joshua ch. 10 v.11. However, his intention is less to give a scientific account than to point 
out the simple fact that the modern idea of a miracle, as an event deviating from the laws 
of Nature, was completely alien to the ancient Hebrews.22 It is true that the Book of Joshua 
talks about God subjugating the sun, the moon, water, and air, but this does not imply that 
God reveals himself in superseding Nature. Instead, according to Spinoza, the implication is 
that it confirms the supremacy of Jehovah, God of Hosts, over those visible godlike beings 
of the gentiles. The story simply reflects the Hebrews’ unexpected success in subduing other 
groups, and nothing more.23 So, the phenomenon did appear to the Hebrews as a form of 
divine support but, as it occurred by natural causes, it provides no basis on which to verify 
the existence of an event contrary to Nature.
Spinoza’s target is the common opinion of his day that took miracles as evidence 
of the supernatural power of God. “They consider that God is inactive all the while that 
Nature pursues her normal course, and conversely, that Nature’s power and natural causes 
are suspended as long as God is acting. Thus they imagine that there are two powers quite 
distinct from each other, the power of God and the power of Nature, though the latter is 
determined by God, whose power they imagine to be like the rule of some royal potentate.”24 
20 TTP, p.82, pp.86-87.
21 “...ad miracula ut realiter contigerint intelligendum...” TTP, p.93
22 TTP, pp.35-37.
23 TTP, pp.82-83, p.92.
24 TTP, p.81.
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It was because of this belief that such people cast doubt on the new Cartesian trend in 
natural sciences at that time, and were provided with a pretext for bringing an accusation of 
impiety against such teachings. They considered that the clearest possible evidence of God’s 
existence was provided when Nature deviated from her proper order. “Therefore they believe 
that all those who explain phenomena and miracles through natural causes, or who strive 
to understand them so, are doing away with God, or at least God’s providence....”25 Behind 
this lay a resentment of freedom of thought, which was increased by the liberal policy of 
the ruling bodies. Considering the numbers of pamphlets that circulated, and the consequent 
and presumably high literacy rates of Dutch commoners, it is difficult to believe that the 
vulgus remained in ignorance of the burning issues of the day. In fact, the Dutch Republic 
was in some danger of losing control over theologico-political disputes, given the widespread 
resentment of intellectual freedom. 
This is why the problem of miracles was a crucial issue for Spinoza. Many believed 
that it was only by abolishing natural causes and imagining supernatural events that they 
were able to worship God. Spinoza denies that this is true to Scripture. In letters he says 
that such a presumption is a “new style of argumentation” for the existence of God that was 
introduced by “modern Christians” and is, therefore, totally alien to the thought of the ancient 
Hebrews. On the contrary, he declares, his own view of miracles, which admits God not 
as transcendent cause but as an immanent cause, does not diverge at all from that of all the 
ancient Hebrews.26 In fact, they called a storm the chiding of God, and thunder and lightning 
the arrows of God. For the same reason miracles are called the works of God: “For surely 
all natural phenomena are the works of God, existing and acting through the divine power 
alone.”27 Surprisingly, Spinoza regards himself as closer to the Hebraic tradition.
Thus, we can conclude that Spinoza admits the reality of miracles. Of course, he reminds 
us of the necessary circumspection involved in this belief. A distinction must be made 
between the phenomenon itself and what the witnesses took it for. We should also be aware 
of expressions peculiar to Hebrew that otherwise seem to say something incredible. The 
visionary bent of prophets should also be taken into account.28 In any case, Spinoza firmly 
denies the opinion that the import of miracles is to provide evidence of the supernatural 
intervention of God, this opinion being no more than a popular pretext for attacking rational 
thought.29 On the contrary, examination of Scripture reveals that the speculative question of 
how such events could have happened did not even arise in the minds of the ancient Hebrews 
25 Ibid.
26 Ep 73, Ep 75.
27 TTP, pp.23-24.
28 TTP, pp.91-95.
29 TTP, pp.81, pp.95-96.
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and, therefore, has nothing to do with revelation. By establishing the fact that those who 
reported miracles were no scholars, Spinoza shows that it is pointless to decide such matters 
by seeking evidence in Scripture. This explains the irregularity of the chapter. In considering 
miracles, Spinoza deviates from his dictum that, “All our understanding of Scripture and 
of matters spiritual must be sought from Scripture alone.”30 However, since the question of 
whether miracles are natural or supernatural is alien to Scripture, it would better to conduct 
such a discussion by philosophical examination alone. This does not imply that it has no 
support in Scripture. The passages of Scripture show nothing contrary to the tenet that 
“miracles were natural occurrences.”31
3 Miracles and superstition — conclusion
Thus we come to understand why the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus does not mix miracla 
with superstitio. There is no need to avoid miracles, under suspicion of superstition, by 
ignoring relations of incredible events; nor should an attempt be made to merge them with 
one’s philosophical or theological belief, by forcing such passages to say something they 
do not say. What good does it do to ascribe astronomical knowledge to Joshua, who was a 
plain military man of ancient times?32 What is crucial for Spinoza is, rather, the concern that 
drives people to such temerity. It arises from a deep-rooted prejudice on the part of those 
who suspect natural reason of overthrowing Scriptural authority and, thus, of undermining 
the universal piety of the society. Spinoza saw this prejudice affecting not only orthodox 
theologians but also the minds of the sophisticated intellectuals of the time, such as the 
Cartesians, who had serious apprehensions about creeping atheism.33 We may say that it is 
this prejudice that the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus attempts to remove, by demonstrating 
that it has no ground in Scripture. As we have seen, the issue of whether miracles are 
supernatural or natural has nothing to do with prophetic discourse. On the contrary, says 
Spinoza, textual evidence requires us to accept that every work of Nature was regarded by 
the ancients as the work of God, and that these two are actually one and the same. There is 
therefore nothing impious in holding that everything, without exception, occurs according 
to the laws of Nature.34 Once this prejudice is removed, there remain no objections to the 
pursuit of natural sciences. 
30 TTP, pp.23-24.
31 TTP, pp.94-96.
32 TTP, 36.
33 Cf. Ep 30.
34 TTP, pp.95-96.
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We are now in a position to say that it is the above prejudice that Spinoza denounces 
as the superstitio of the day. “Happy indeed would be our age, if we were to see religion 
freed again from all superstition,” says Spinoza, referring to the Apostles, who once taught 
religion “free from philosophical speculations.”35 It is obvious that by superstitio he 
means speculative involvement, as illustrated by the deviant idea of miracles held by some 
modern Christians, Cartesians as well as theologians. Note again that, when talking about 
the superstition of the masses of his day, who are prone to instigation under the pretext of 
religion, Spinoza denotes it by the name of Gentilium superstitiones, or the “superstitions of 
the Gentiles,” which implies a deviation from genuine religion.36
It is now clear that miracla do not have the same rank as superstitio, based on Spinoza’s 
use of the words. This said, what is Spinoza’s own conception of miracles? The clue is in the 
way in which he relates both miracla and superstitio to the vicissitudes of the state. As we 
have seen, it is “in the state’s gravest difficulties” that superstition holds its strongest sway 
over the people, and is most formidable to their own rulers.37 Contrasting passages on miracles 
appear in Chapter III, where Spinoza interprets the vocation of the Hebrews. Though there is 
no such thing as election, there must have been some experience that led them to be convinced 
of it, he supposes. His assumption is that a society composed of men who lack wisdom and 
vigilance is largely dependent on fortune and is less stable. If it nevertheless endures for some 
considerable time, this is to be attributed to some other guidance, not its own.
Indeed, if it overcomes great perils and enjoys prosperity, it cannot fail to marvel at 
and worship God’s guidance (insofar as God acts through hidden external causes, and 
not through the nature and mind of man); for what it has experienced is far beyond its 
expectation and belief, and can truly be regarded even as a miracle.38
Such was the case of the Hebrew state. When first establishing the state, Moses saw that, 
“His people could not accomplish their undertaking without mighty miracles and the special 
external help of God, and must assuredly perish without such help,” and so he besought this 
special external help of God by means of a covenant, so that God willed them to be saved.39 
We will not go into detail here, but the close examination that Spinoza deployed in Chapter 
XVIII shows that Moses was astute enough to design a state that could rely on the constant 
obedience of the multitude, thanks to its ingenious juridical, military, and religious systems. 
As the power of the state is defined—according to the later Tractatus Politicus—by the 
35 TTP, p.158.
36 TTP, p.7.
37 TTP, p6.
38 TTP, p.47; emphasis is my own.
39 TTP, p.53.
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power of the multitude,40 this regime of theocracy had unexpected success, under favorable 
circumstances, in overcoming great perils, and the nation was blessed with prosperity. Since 
this was far beyond their expectations, it is not surprising that they regarded what they 
had experienced as a miracle. Spinoza thus concludes that if the Hebrews surpassed other 
nations, it was in this alone that, “They were successful in achieving security for themselves 
and overcame great dangers, and this chiefly by God’s external help alone.”41 All this, he 
emphasizes, is clear to anyone who reads Scripture in a straightforward way. Thus, when 
Scripture says that no other nation has its Gods so nigh unto them as the Jews have their God, 
this must be understood with regard to the independence of their state, and “as referring only 
to the time when so many miracles befell them.”42
Scripture also tells of the vicissitudes of the Hebrew state. The marvelous days were 
gone, and were followed by an anguishing series of splits and sedition after the death of 
Moses. According to Spinoza, this was due to the fatal corruption of the original equality 
among the federated tribes, and the consequent turmoil induced the Jews to seek a mortal 
king. This breach of common citizenship on the basis of the divine rule caused fresh 
sedition.43 In fact, after the original theocracy changed into a monarchy, there was practically 
no end to civil wars, and the fighting reached a level of ferocity that surpassed all previous 
records. Spinoza does not fail to point out that, after the election of kings, we find an 
abundance of prophets at the same time. Furthermore, we see the people being deceived 
by false prophets only during the rule of kings, for many eagerly sought their favour.44 In 
this, we hear again the echo of Curtius on superstition. The multitude is readily induced, 
under the guise of religion, “now to worship its rulers as gods, and then again to curse and 
condemn them as mankind’s common bane.”45 This inconstancy has been the cause of many 
terrible uprisings and wars--and in fact it led ultimately to the downfall of the entire state. 
Returning from the Babylonian exile, they restored the second temple and theocracy, but 
this was nothing more than the shadow of the first, because the high priests then acquired 
the authority to issue decrees and transact government business. To gain the support of the 
masses, they adapted Scripture to suit their immorality, and deviated from the true meaning 
and interpretation of the laws. Thus, “Religion degenerated into pernicious superstition” and 
yielded to sectarian divisions that knew no end.46 There is no doubt that Spinoza saw therein 
40 TP, III, 2.
41 TTP, p.47.
42 TTP, pp.49-50; emphasis is my own.
43 TTP, pp.218-220.
44 TTP, pp.224-225.
45 TTP, p.6.
46 TTP, pp.221-223; emphasis is my own.
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a reflection of his own time. In periods of anguish the vulgus seek omens, and, “If they are 
struck with wonder at some unusual phenomenon, they believe this to be a portent signifying 
the anger of the gods or of a supreme deity, and therefore regard it as a pious duty to avert the 
evil by sacrifice and vows, susceptible as they are to superstition and opposed to religion.”47 
In the time of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, the easy targets were those, “Who explain 
phenomena and miracles through natural causes, or who strive to understand them so.”48 
Again, the tumultuous time of the Republic did not lack unusual phenomena such as comets, 
sundogs, plague epidemics, etc., which served the vulgus as omens rather than as subjects for 
scientific study. With the theologians of orthodoxy in front, they pressed the civil authority to 
tighten its control of the freedom of thought, which had been relatively well secured during 
the Dutch Republic. It was against this flourishing superstition, which put peace and piety in 
peril, that the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus fought. 
Our considerations so far bring us to the conclusion that, for Spinoza, miracla are the 
index of an effective performance by the state, thanks to a well organized religion, which 
increases the unifying power of the multitude to overcome perils, whereas superstitio 
is the index of “the state’s gravest difficulties,” and results from the degeneration of 
communal religion. In other words, miracla and superstitio are seen by the philosopher 
as a sort of barometer that indicates the vicissitudes of the state’s sovereignty, the power 
of which is again thoroughly determined by the power of the multitude, as Chapter XVII 
shows. Did Spinoza call on people to break with religion and miracles on the grounds 
that they were entirely based on superstition? The answer to this is ‘definitely not’. The 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is a difficult book, and it may look obscure to those who are 
preoccupied by a simplified scheme of the Enlightenment. However, it is indeed an intriguing 
book for those who are able to see the philosopher striving to work out a solution for freedom 
in such a difficult time.
Abbreviations
TTP = Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, with chapter numbers and page numbers according to 
Spinoza Opera, Bd.3.
TP = Tractatus Politicus, with chapter-numbers and section-numbers according to Spinoza 
Opera, Bd.3.
Ep = Epistolae with numbering in the Gebhardt edition Spinoza Opera, Bd.4.
47 TTP, p.5.
48 TTP, p.81.
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